009: Polish bacon fixes, OTA host scripts, and migration docs.
Restore disable_configstore, EuiccDisabler and thermal CDEV guards, branding and rebuild/sync helpers; document device roles, laptop migration, and Gitea. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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# AXP Resurrection Pro — Pixel 4a (sunfish)
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**LineageOS 23.2 · Android 16 · Privacy-oriented custom ROM**
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AXP Resurrection Pro (*AXPR*) brings the **AXP.OS Pro** experience forward onto
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**LineageOS 23.2** for the **Google Pixel 4a**. It is aimed at users who want a
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maintained Android 16 base, **microG** instead of proprietary Google Play
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services, optional **root via Magisk**, and **extra kernel and system
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hardening** drawn from established community sources (including
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**GrapheneOS-class** kernel work), without tying you to deprecated AXP update
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servers.
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This document describes **what the ROM contains**. It is written for end users
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and reviewers, not for build infrastructure.
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**Current generation (example build id):** `23.2-20261008` · `BP4A.251205.006`
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· `release-keys`
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---
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## 1. At a glance
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| Topic | What you get |
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|--------|----------------|
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| **Base** | LineageOS **23.2**, Android **16**, Pixel 4a only |
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| **Google services** | **microG** + **GSF proxy**; no built-in Google account requirement |
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| **Play Store** | **Play Store (Phonesky)** build patched for this project (exact-alarm and related fixes) |
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| **Root** | **Magisk** embedded at build time; you activate from the Magisk app after flash |
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| **Privacy apps** | **Aurora Store**, **Droidify**, **Fossify Gallery**, **Jelly** browser, **OpenEUICC** |
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| **Hardening** | Kernel patches (Graphene-derived + CVE backports), **hardened_malloc**, trimmed system surface |
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| **Updates** | Full ROM via **recovery sideload**; individual system apps can be updated in place when signed compatibly |
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| **Bootloader** | **Unlocked** workflow (orange state); not designed for relocked retail boot |
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---
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## 2. Everything added on top of LineageOS 23.2
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Stock **LineageOS 23.2 for sunfish** is a clean AOSP-derived system: no microG,
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no Play Store, no Magisk, **test-keys** or UNOFFICIAL builds in typical user
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trees, default Private DNS list, default connectivity check (Google), Gallery2
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or Glimpse, full Lineage tool bundle on system, Google carrier/eUICC apps from
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vendor makefiles, and the upstream **4.14** kernel without the AXP/Graphene
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CVE and hardening layers below.
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**AXP Resurrection Pro** keeps the Lineage base (Launcher3, Dialer, updaters,
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device support) and layers the following.
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### 2.1 Product identity and visuals
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| Change | LineageOS default | AXPR |
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|--------|-------------------|------|
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| Build channel | Often UNOFFICIAL / nightly naming | **PRO** product (`…-PRO-sunfish`) |
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| Signing | Test-keys on many community builds | **release-keys** (project keys) |
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| Manufacturer / brand props | Lineage | **AXP Resurrection** system branding |
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| Setup welcome | Lineage wording | **“Welcome to AXP Resurrection”** |
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| Boot animation | Narrow band layout | **Full-screen** 1080×2340 animation |
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| OTA zip name | `lineage-*.zip` | Matching **`AXP-Resurrection-Pro-*.zip`** (same payload) |
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### 2.2 Google replacement stack (not in vanilla LOS)
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| Component | Purpose |
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|-----------|---------|
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| **microG Services (GmsCore)** | Open-source reimplementation of Play Services |
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| **GSF Proxy** | Framework stub for apps expecting Google Services Framework |
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| **Play Store (Phonesky)** | Play client build maintained for this ROM (exact-alarm and related fixes) |
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| **GmsCore native libraries** | ARM64 JNI libs shipped **inside the image** (required for Maps / TLS stacks) |
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Vanilla Lineage does **not** ship these; you would install microG yourself on a
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separate track.
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### 2.3 Extra applications (vs typical LOS sunfish)
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| App | Notes |
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|-----|--------|
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| **Aurora Store** | Play store front-end |
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| **Droidify** | F-Droid client (instead of shipping classic F-Droid) |
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| **Fossify Gallery** | Replaces **Gallery2 / Glimpse** on this product |
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| **Jelly** | Lightweight browser added on **product** (Lineage 23 does not include Jelly in the default sunfish product set) |
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| **OpenEUICC** | Privileged eSIM manager where Google EUICC is removed |
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| **Magisk** | Preroot boot integration + manager (see §5 Root and Magisk) |
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**Unchanged vs LOS intent:** **Launcher3** (no NeoLauncher), standard Lineage
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core apps, **Lineage WebView** as default provider.
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### 2.4 Settings and framework behaviour (AXP / GrapheneOS / Calyx class)
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These are **code changes in the platform**, not separate APKs.
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#### Privacy and network
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| Feature | What Lineage does | What AXPR adds |
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|---------|-------------------|----------------|
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| **Private DNS presets** | Small default set | **15+ named providers** (AdGuard, Mullvad, Quad9, Cloudflare, regional DoT hosts, etc.) |
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| **Internet connectivity check** | Fixed Google-style check | **User-selectable** provider (Disabled, Amazon, Cloudflare, Google, Huawei, Kuketz, Microsoft, openSUSE, Ubuntu, …) — no AXP-owned servers |
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| **Force disable SUPL** | Not exposed | Settings toggle; forces SUPL off for stricter GNSS |
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| **Stop extra location assistance** | Not exposed | Toggle to stop extra Qualcomm / XTRA-style assistance when disabled |
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| **Kernel command line privacy** | `/proc/cmdline` often world-readable | **Mode 0440** on `/proc/cmdline` for unprivileged apps (GOLDEN/AXP class) |
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#### Security, biometrics, and media metadata
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| Feature | What Lineage does | What AXPR adds |
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|---------|-------------------|----------------|
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| **Fingerprint permanent lockout** | Higher failed-attempt threshold | **Stricter lockout** (AXP constant: fewer attempts before permanent lockout) |
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| **Build serial exposure** | Legacy paths may expose serial via deprecated APIs | **`Build.SERIAL` stays unknown**; real serial only via `Build.getSerial()` + permission |
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| **Screenshot EXIF** | OS name, time, unique id in metadata | **Minimal EXIF** (width/height only — Calyx/AXP class) |
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| **Recovery OTA metadata** | Can accept packages restricted to device serial | **Rejects** update packages that carry a `serialno=` constraint |
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| **Signature spoofing** | microG base only | Developer option **`allow_signature_fake`** (default **off**) for microG / compatible apps |
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| **Call recording** | Region/carrier gated | Developer option **`extendrom_call_recording`** unlocks recording path in Dialer where supported |
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| **FLAG_SECURE / screen capture** | Apps can block capture | Optional **`disable_secure_windows`** (default **off**), works on **user** builds without `ro.debuggable=1` |
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| **Disable app** | Android 16 emphasises **Archive**; disable hidden for many user apps | **Disable** restored for **user-installed** apps in Settings |
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| **Native debug** | Standard ptrace policy | **`persist.native_debug`** — when enabled, relaxes ptrace scope for debugging (default off) |
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#### Timeouts and System UI
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| Feature | What Lineage does | What AXPR adds |
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|---------|-------------------|----------------|
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| **Automatic reboot** | Not in stock LOS Settings | Idle **auto-reboot** (Security settings) |
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| **Bluetooth timeout** | Manual only | Turns **Bluetooth off** after configurable inactivity |
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| **Wi‑Fi timeout** | Manual only | Turns **Wi‑Fi off** after configurable inactivity |
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| **Quick Settings tiles** | Usable from lock screen per tile | **Sensitive tiles require unlock** first (GrapheneOS SystemUI patch) |
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| **Keyguard / reboot** | Standard | SystemUI / SystemServer hooks for timeout and reboot integration (AXP server extensions) |
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### 2.5 Packages and binaries removed (vs Lineage sunfish)
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Selective **deblob**, not a generic “remove all Google” script.
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#### Wave 1 — Google eUICC LPA
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| Removed | Replaced by |
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|---------|-------------|
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| **EuiccGoogle**, **EuiccGoogleOverlay** | **OpenEUICC** (EuiccSupportPixel support packages **kept**) |
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#### Wave 2 — Carrier / RCS Google & AOSP entitlement
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| Removed (examples) | Kept for radio |
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|--------------------|----------------|
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| **CarrierServices**, **CarrierSettings**, **CarrierWifi**, **CarrierSetup**, **RilConfigService**, **grilservice** | **ims**, **QtiTelephonyService**, Qualcomm daemons, **Dialer**, **GoogleParts** |
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| **PresencePolling**, **RcsService** (device makefile) | |
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| **ImsServiceEntitlement** (telephony product) | |
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#### Wave 3 — Lineage maintenance tools on system
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| Removed from system / system_ext | Still on AXPR (AXP parity) |
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|----------------------------------|----------------------------|
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| **bash**, **htop**, **nano**, **unrar**, **addon.d/50-lineage.sh** | **curl**, **vim**, **zstd**, recovery **nano** |
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#### Wave 4 — Debug / diag surface
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| Removed | Explicitly kept |
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|---------|-----------------|
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| Qualcomm **diag_*** tools, **test_diag**, **imsrcsd** | **loc_launcher**, **lowi-server**, **xtra-daemon**, IMS RTP/data daemons, **cnss-daemon**; keep Lineage **disable_configstore** (overrides HIDL configstore HAL — required on A16 VINTF) |
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| Some **AOSP debug** host tools on device where safe | **bpftool**, **alloctop**, **apexd-lsof** remain in build where the OS requires them |
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#### Product OpenSSH (US-S4-1)
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| Removed | Kept |
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|---------|------|
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| **ssh**, **sshd**, **scp**, **sftp**, **rsync**, **procmem** on product | **`init.openssh.rc`** stub only (no `sshd` binary) — remote admin via **adb** / Magisk |
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### 2.6 Kernel, allocator, and CVEs (summary)
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On top of the **same msm-4.14** tree Lineage ships:
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- **30 GrapheneOS-derived** kernel patches (Deny USB, allocsize, fortify, slab, sanitize, ro_after_init, randomisation, …) — see §8 below.
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- Extra **Kconfig**: FORTIFY, init-on-alloc/free, dmesg restrict, slab hardened, **SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM**; **no Yama** (app compatibility).
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- **449** documented **CVE** backport identifiers + companion fixes (e.g. USB lock-scope instead of raw **CVE-2022-49980** one-liner).
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- **hardened_malloc** in **bionic** for 64-bit processes (with graphics/camera exclusions).
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Lineage’s existing hardening (CFI, shadow stack, KASLR, PAN, …) is **retained**.
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### 2.7 Intentionally **not** changed vs Lineage
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- **No** GrapheneOS-style **location lockdown** kernel (GPS behaviour stays LOS-like).
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- **No** Aosmium / proprietary AXP WebView baked in.
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- **No** AXP online OTA or external market repositories.
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- **No** KernelSU in the standard product.
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- **No** bundled Play Integrity / banking Magisk modules.
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- **Device tree / modem firmware** line unchanged (Pixel 4a vendor blobs).
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---
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## 3. Who this ROM is for
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- You use **microG** and install apps via **Aurora** / **Droidify** / Play as you choose.
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- You want **AXP-style settings** (private DNS presets, connectivity controls, classic **Disable app**, timeouts, optional signature spoofing and call-recording unlock) on a **current Lineage** tree.
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- You accept **custom ROM risks**: unlocked bootloader, community maintenance, no warranty.
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**Not goals of this ROM:** banking attestation guarantees, locked bootloader,
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proprietary AXP OTA infrastructure, or shipping every Google / carrier app from
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stock Pixel firmware.
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---
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## 4. Preinstalled applications
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| App | Role |
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|-----|------|
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| **microG Services (GmsCore)** | Replaces Google Play Services for many apps |
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| **GSF Proxy** | Google Services Framework compatibility layer |
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| **Play Store (Phonesky)** | Google Play client (project-maintained APK) |
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| **Aurora Store** | Alternative store front-end for Play |
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| **Droidify** | Lightweight F-Droid client |
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| **Fossify Gallery** | Gallery (replaces Lineage Gallery2 / Glimpse on this product) |
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| **Jelly** | Small browser on the product partition |
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| **OpenEUICC** | eSIM / EUICC management (replaces Google EUICC where removed) |
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| **Magisk** | Root manager (stub until you complete first-time setup) |
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| **LineageOS core** | Launcher3, Dialer, Messaging, etc. |
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**WebView:** default is **Lineage / AOSP WebView**. You may install another
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WebView provider and select it under **Developer options → WebView
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implementation** (Aosmium and other legacy AXP WebViews are **not** shipped as
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default).
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---
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## 5. Root and Magisk
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- Magisk is integrated into the **boot image at ROM build time** (AXP / EXTENDROM
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style **preroot**), not as a normal preinstalled Play-style system app only.
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- After flashing, open **Magisk** once and allow it to **download and install**
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the current manager APK if prompted.
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- **Do not** use “Install to inactive slot” or repeated boot repatching unless
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you know you need it: the boot image is already prepared. Extra patching often
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confuses the app and can break A/B slots.
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- The home screen line **“Ramdisk: Yes/No”** describes how Magisk would install
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on a *stock* device; on preroot builds it may read **No** even when root works.
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Check **Magisk version** and whether apps can request superuser.
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- **Zygisk**, **DenyList**, and modules are **your choice** after activation;
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the ROM does not ship banking or Play Integrity fix modules.
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**KernelSU** is **not** part of this product line.
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---
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## 6. Settings and toggles (reference)
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Same features as **§2.4**; quick lookup by menu area.
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These appear in **Settings** / **Developer options** (exact menus follow AOSP
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Lineage layout). Names may be localized.
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### 6.1 Privacy and network
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| Feature | What it does |
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|---------|----------------|
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| **Private DNS providers** | Extended preset list (AdGuard, Mullvad, Quad9, Cloudflare, Google DoT, regional providers, etc.) in addition to Lineage defaults |
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| **Internet connectivity check** | Configurable connectivity validation (AXP-style behaviour; no dependency on AXP-owned servers) |
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| **Force disable SUPL** | When enabled, disables SUPL-assisted GNSS (stricter location privacy) |
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| **Stop extra location assistance** | When enabled, reduces extra Qualcomm / XTRA-style assistance daemons |
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### 6.2 Security and developer
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| Feature | What it does |
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|---------|----------------|
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| **Signature spoofing** | Developer option to allow microG / selected apps to spoof signatures (restricted API) |
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| **Call recording unlock** | Toggle to allow call recording where supported (AXP / EXTENDROM class) |
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| **FLAG_SECURE override** | Optional global override for screen capture blocking (default **off**) |
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| **Native debug / ptrace** | `persist.native_debug` — when enabled, relaxes ptrace scope for debugging (default off) |
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| **Disable app** | Classic **disable** for user apps restored alongside Android’s archive behaviour |
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### 6.3 Timeouts (Security / connected devices)
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| Feature | What it does |
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|---------|----------------|
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| **Automatic reboot** | Reboot after configurable idle time |
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| **Bluetooth timeout** | Turn off Bluetooth after inactivity |
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| **Wi‑Fi timeout** | Turn off Wi‑Fi after inactivity |
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### 6.4 Branding
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- **Build type:** Lineage **PRO** channel naming (`AXP Resurrection Pro` product)
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- **Release keys** (not `test-keys`) on shipped builds
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||||
---
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## 7. System surface changes (deblob summary)
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Full package-level detail is in **§2.5**. Short overview:
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AXP Resurrection Pro **selectively removes** components that AXP Pro omitted or
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that are unnecessary on a microG device. This is **not** a blind “remove
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everything Google” script.
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**Typical removals (by category):**
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||||
| Category | Examples of what is removed or not shipped |
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|----------|---------------------------------------------|
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| **Google EUICC / LPA** | Google’s eUICC app (OpenEUICC replaces user-facing LPA) |
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| **Carrier / RCS Google** | Selected Google carrier and RCS packages not needed for microG |
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| **Lineage maintenance tools on device** | Interactive shells and convenience packages on **system** that AXP Pro did not ship (e.g. `bash`, `htop`, `nano`, `unrar`, Lineage `addon.d` helper) |
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| **Lab / debug commands** | Further debug-only binaries trimmed in the full “wave 4” product |
|
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**Retained (examples):** IMS, telephony services, Wi‑Fi / cellular stack,
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||||
Widevine, camera, Qualcomm services required for daily use, `curl` / `vim` where
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AXP Pro kept them.
|
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**Product partition:** OpenSSH **binaries** are not shipped; an **`init.openssh.rc`
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||||
stub** may remain (AXP Pro parity) without shipping `sshd` on product.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Kernel and memory hardening
|
||||
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||||
**Kernel version line:** Linux **4.14** (Qualcomm msm-4.14), as shipped by
|
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Lineage for Pixel 4a — **not** upgraded to a GKI 6.x kernel.
|
||||
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||||
### 7.1 Already strong on Lineage (kept)
|
||||
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||||
Examples: Clang CFI, shadow call stack, stack protector, KASLR, PAN, hardened
|
||||
usercopy, restricted perf events, and related options in the upstream sunfish
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||||
defconfig.
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.2 GrapheneOS-derived Stage 1 pack (30 patches)
|
||||
|
||||
Backported **GrapheneOS / Android Hardening** series via the AXP kernel patch
|
||||
collection, including:
|
||||
|
||||
| Series | Purpose (summary) |
|
||||
|--------|-------------------|
|
||||
| **Deny USB** | Optional hardening around USB attack surface |
|
||||
| **allocsize** | Allocation size hardening helpers |
|
||||
| **bugon** | `ksize` / BUG_ON integrity checks |
|
||||
| **fortify** | Intra-object FORTIFY helpers in kernel |
|
||||
| **misc** | Miscellaneous hardening commits |
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||||
| **random** | Brk / argument randomization |
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| **ro** | `__ro_after_init` and related read-only data hardening |
|
||||
| **sanitize** | Page / slab sanitization helpers |
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||||
| **slab** | SLAB hardening companions |
|
||||
| **unused** | Removal of unused kernel API noise |
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||||
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||||
**Kernel config enabled with this stack (examples):**
|
||||
|
||||
- `CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE`
|
||||
- `CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON` / `CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON`
|
||||
- `CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT`
|
||||
- `CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED`
|
||||
- `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM` (US-S5-1 class)
|
||||
- **Yama LSM not enabled** (compat with apps using self-ptrace; matches classic AXP kernel posture)
|
||||
|
||||
**Not ported:** GrapheneOS **location lockdown** kernel policy (this ROM keeps
|
||||
Lineage-style location behaviour and precision).
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.3 Userspace allocator
|
||||
|
||||
- **hardened_malloc** (64-bit) integrated into **bionic** for eligible processes,
|
||||
with exclusions for graphics / camera stacks where required for stability.
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.4 CVE backports
|
||||
|
||||
The ROM applies a large set of **Linux kernel CVE backports** on top of the
|
||||
4.14 sunfish kernel, from the same curated lists used in AXP / Divest-style
|
||||
trees:
|
||||
|
||||
| Set | Count | Notes |
|
||||
|-----|-------|--------|
|
||||
| **Primary backport set** | **429** patch entries | Stable “clean offset” apply list |
|
||||
| **High-offset batches 1–3** | **27** extra patch entries | Larger backports with relaxed offset matching |
|
||||
| **Unique CVE identifiers (combined)** | **449** | Deduplicated ids in the list file below |
|
||||
|
||||
**Full CVE identifier list:** [`kernel-cve-backport-list.txt`](kernel-cve-backport-list.txt)
|
||||
(one CVE id per line, sorted).
|
||||
|
||||
**Special cases (not in the 449 list as-is):**
|
||||
|
||||
- **CVE-2022-49980** — raw one-liner backport is **denied**; a **lock-scope /
|
||||
UAF companion patch** is applied instead (USB subsystem stability).
|
||||
- Additional CVE paths may appear on a **denylist** when they conflict with
|
||||
sunfish drivers (Wi‑Fi, audio, etc.); those are skipped intentionally.
|
||||
|
||||
Platform **Android security patch** level follows **LineageOS merges** (e.g.
|
||||
`2026-09-01` on recent builds). **Vendor** (bootloader/modem) patch level
|
||||
remains on the **2023-09-05** line appropriate for Pixel 4a vendor blobs.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Verified Boot and signing
|
||||
|
||||
- Builds are signed with **project release keys** (`release-keys`).
|
||||
- **AVB** metadata uses the project key; **verification flags** suit an
|
||||
**unlocked** bootloader with Magisk (not a locked retail verified-boot product).
|
||||
- **Do not** downgrade vendor security patch below the ROM’s minimum without
|
||||
expecting install blocks or encryption init failures.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. Installation (summary)
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Unlock bootloader** (erases data).
|
||||
2. Flash **boot** + **dtbo** from the **same** ROM package if you are not already
|
||||
on this ROM’s recovery (Pixel 4a uses recovery-in-boot).
|
||||
3. Boot **recovery** → **Factory reset / format data**.
|
||||
4. **Apply update → ADB sideload** the full `AXP-Resurrection-Pro-*.zip`.
|
||||
5. Reboot, complete setup, then **Magisk** first-time APK install as above.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the **full OTA zip**; flashing only `boot.img` does not update system,
|
||||
microG, or apps.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 11. What this ROM does **not** promise
|
||||
|
||||
- No official Google certification or Play Protect “device integrity” guarantee.
|
||||
- No bundled **Play Integrity Fix** or banking modules.
|
||||
- No **AXP.OS** online update servers or external market repositories.
|
||||
- No **NeoLauncher** (Lineage Launcher3 remains).
|
||||
- No **KernelSU** in the standard build.
|
||||
- **Banking apps** may work in work profiles or Island; that is **app-specific**
|
||||
and not a ship guarantee.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 12. Credits and lineage
|
||||
|
||||
- **LineageOS** — base operating system and device support.
|
||||
- **microG project** — free Google services reimplementation.
|
||||
- **Magisk** (topjohnwu) — root framework.
|
||||
- **AXP.OS / EXTENDROM** — product philosophy, preroot Magisk packaging, and
|
||||
many userspace behaviours cloned on this port.
|
||||
- **GrapheneOS / Android Hardening** — kernel patch series (via AXP kernel
|
||||
patch collection).
|
||||
- **Community apps:** Aurora, Droidify, Fossify, OpenEUICC, Jelly, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
AXP Resurrection Pro is an **independent community port**. It is not an official
|
||||
LineageOS, Google, or AXP.OS GmbH product.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 13. Document history
|
||||
|
||||
| Version | Date | Notes |
|
||||
|---------|------|--------|
|
||||
| 1.1 | 2026-10-11 | Added **§2** delta vs LineageOS (features, removals, framework) |
|
||||
| 1.0 | 2026-10-11 | Initial public feature list for `23.2-20261008` generation |
|
||||
|
||||
For maintainers: internal engineering docs remain separate under `docs/` in the
|
||||
source repository.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,449 @@
|
||||
CVE-2015-7837
|
||||
CVE-2016-3695
|
||||
CVE-2017-18232
|
||||
CVE-2017-5754
|
||||
CVE-2018-20855
|
||||
CVE-2018-5897
|
||||
CVE-2018-9415
|
||||
CVE-2019-10520
|
||||
CVE-2019-11191
|
||||
CVE-2019-12378
|
||||
CVE-2019-12455
|
||||
CVE-2019-12456
|
||||
CVE-2019-12819
|
||||
CVE-2019-15291
|
||||
CVE-2019-16921
|
||||
CVE-2019-18786
|
||||
CVE-2019-19051
|
||||
CVE-2019-19068
|
||||
CVE-2019-19602
|
||||
CVE-2019-20908
|
||||
CVE-2019-3874
|
||||
CVE-2019-9444
|
||||
CVE-2020-0255
|
||||
CVE-2020-15780
|
||||
CVE-2020-16119
|
||||
CVE-2020-29372
|
||||
CVE-2020-8832
|
||||
CVE-2020-BleedingToothExtras
|
||||
CVE-2021-28039
|
||||
CVE-2021-28950
|
||||
CVE-2021-29154
|
||||
CVE-2021-30337
|
||||
CVE-2021-3493
|
||||
CVE-2021-46912
|
||||
CVE-2021-46958
|
||||
CVE-2021-46999
|
||||
CVE-2021-47010
|
||||
CVE-2021-47058
|
||||
CVE-2021-47173
|
||||
CVE-2021-47209
|
||||
CVE-2021-47234
|
||||
CVE-2021-47266
|
||||
CVE-2021-47299
|
||||
CVE-2021-47346
|
||||
CVE-2021-47430
|
||||
CVE-2021-47472
|
||||
CVE-2021-47583
|
||||
CVE-2021-47616
|
||||
CVE-2021-47618
|
||||
CVE-2021-47636
|
||||
CVE-2022-21546
|
||||
CVE-2022-27950
|
||||
CVE-2022-3061
|
||||
CVE-2022-3903
|
||||
CVE-2022-4382
|
||||
CVE-2022-48674
|
||||
CVE-2022-48713
|
||||
CVE-2022-48781
|
||||
CVE-2022-48785
|
||||
CVE-2022-48966
|
||||
CVE-2022-49034
|
||||
CVE-2022-49061
|
||||
CVE-2022-49073
|
||||
CVE-2022-49078
|
||||
CVE-2022-49146
|
||||
CVE-2022-49194
|
||||
CVE-2022-49205
|
||||
CVE-2022-49209
|
||||
CVE-2022-49285
|
||||
CVE-2022-49318
|
||||
CVE-2022-49341
|
||||
CVE-2022-49363
|
||||
CVE-2022-49364
|
||||
CVE-2022-49380
|
||||
CVE-2022-49412
|
||||
CVE-2022-49425
|
||||
CVE-2022-49428
|
||||
CVE-2022-49433
|
||||
CVE-2022-49500
|
||||
CVE-2022-49513
|
||||
CVE-2022-49563
|
||||
CVE-2022-49564
|
||||
CVE-2022-49566
|
||||
CVE-2022-49641
|
||||
CVE-2022-49642
|
||||
CVE-2022-49705
|
||||
CVE-2022-49710
|
||||
CVE-2022-49777
|
||||
CVE-2022-49779
|
||||
CVE-2022-49784
|
||||
CVE-2022-49823
|
||||
CVE-2022-49824
|
||||
CVE-2022-49825
|
||||
CVE-2022-49839
|
||||
CVE-2022-49863
|
||||
CVE-2022-49990
|
||||
CVE-2022-49993
|
||||
CVE-2022-50013
|
||||
CVE-2022-50062
|
||||
CVE-2022-50074
|
||||
CVE-2022-50246
|
||||
CVE-2022-50248
|
||||
CVE-2022-50273
|
||||
CVE-2022-50326
|
||||
CVE-2022-50358
|
||||
CVE-2022-50364
|
||||
CVE-2022-50397
|
||||
CVE-2022-50473
|
||||
CVE-2022-50522
|
||||
CVE-2022-50537
|
||||
CVE-2023-1989
|
||||
CVE-2023-21657
|
||||
CVE-2023-23000
|
||||
CVE-2023-28554
|
||||
CVE-2023-33070
|
||||
CVE-2023-3777
|
||||
CVE-2023-52523
|
||||
CVE-2023-52595
|
||||
CVE-2023-52604
|
||||
CVE-2023-52676
|
||||
CVE-2023-52707
|
||||
CVE-2023-52746
|
||||
CVE-2023-52884
|
||||
CVE-2023-52979
|
||||
CVE-2023-53001
|
||||
CVE-2023-53016
|
||||
CVE-2023-53098
|
||||
CVE-2023-53125
|
||||
CVE-2023-53129
|
||||
CVE-2023-53131
|
||||
CVE-2023-53137
|
||||
CVE-2023-53214
|
||||
CVE-2023-53227
|
||||
CVE-2023-53250
|
||||
CVE-2023-53259
|
||||
CVE-2023-53265
|
||||
CVE-2023-53288
|
||||
CVE-2023-53312
|
||||
CVE-2023-53436
|
||||
CVE-2023-53443
|
||||
CVE-2023-53487
|
||||
CVE-2023-53537
|
||||
CVE-2023-53594
|
||||
CVE-2023-53599
|
||||
CVE-2023-53626
|
||||
CVE-2023-53641
|
||||
CVE-2023-53669
|
||||
CVE-2023-53693
|
||||
CVE-2023-53695
|
||||
CVE-2023-53709
|
||||
CVE-2023-53712
|
||||
CVE-2023-53719
|
||||
CVE-2024-26643
|
||||
CVE-2024-26645
|
||||
CVE-2024-26720
|
||||
CVE-2024-26760
|
||||
CVE-2024-26920
|
||||
CVE-2024-26961
|
||||
CVE-2024-26972
|
||||
CVE-2024-27009
|
||||
CVE-2024-27033
|
||||
CVE-2024-27393
|
||||
CVE-2024-33032
|
||||
CVE-2024-34027
|
||||
CVE-2024-35812
|
||||
CVE-2024-35824
|
||||
CVE-2024-35879
|
||||
CVE-2024-35933
|
||||
CVE-2024-35950
|
||||
CVE-2024-35954
|
||||
CVE-2024-35962
|
||||
CVE-2024-39501
|
||||
CVE-2024-40917
|
||||
CVE-2024-40954
|
||||
CVE-2024-40996
|
||||
CVE-2024-41041
|
||||
CVE-2024-42077
|
||||
CVE-2024-42102
|
||||
CVE-2024-42296
|
||||
CVE-2024-43879
|
||||
CVE-2024-43894
|
||||
CVE-2024-44938
|
||||
CVE-2024-44939
|
||||
CVE-2024-44952
|
||||
CVE-2024-46681
|
||||
CVE-2024-46754
|
||||
CVE-2024-47747
|
||||
CVE-2024-50017
|
||||
CVE-2024-50019
|
||||
CVE-2024-50184
|
||||
CVE-2024-50186
|
||||
CVE-2024-50195
|
||||
CVE-2024-50201
|
||||
CVE-2024-50210
|
||||
CVE-2024-50265
|
||||
CVE-2024-50267
|
||||
CVE-2024-50269
|
||||
CVE-2024-50279
|
||||
CVE-2024-50287
|
||||
CVE-2024-50290
|
||||
CVE-2024-50292
|
||||
CVE-2024-50295
|
||||
CVE-2024-50299
|
||||
CVE-2024-50301
|
||||
CVE-2024-52332
|
||||
CVE-2024-53045
|
||||
CVE-2024-53101
|
||||
CVE-2024-53103
|
||||
CVE-2024-53112
|
||||
CVE-2024-53127
|
||||
CVE-2024-53140
|
||||
CVE-2024-53141
|
||||
CVE-2024-53156
|
||||
CVE-2024-53157
|
||||
CVE-2024-53165
|
||||
CVE-2024-53171
|
||||
CVE-2024-53172
|
||||
CVE-2024-53183
|
||||
CVE-2024-53190
|
||||
CVE-2024-53194
|
||||
CVE-2024-53214
|
||||
CVE-2024-53227
|
||||
CVE-2024-53239
|
||||
CVE-2024-53680
|
||||
CVE-2024-53690
|
||||
CVE-2024-56531
|
||||
CVE-2024-56532
|
||||
CVE-2024-56536
|
||||
CVE-2024-56539
|
||||
CVE-2024-56548
|
||||
CVE-2024-56569
|
||||
CVE-2024-56570
|
||||
CVE-2024-56586
|
||||
CVE-2024-56587
|
||||
CVE-2024-56593
|
||||
CVE-2024-56595
|
||||
CVE-2024-56597
|
||||
CVE-2024-56600
|
||||
CVE-2024-56602
|
||||
CVE-2024-56603
|
||||
CVE-2024-56619
|
||||
CVE-2024-56629
|
||||
CVE-2024-56637
|
||||
CVE-2024-56643
|
||||
CVE-2024-56659
|
||||
CVE-2024-56670
|
||||
CVE-2024-56681
|
||||
CVE-2024-56687
|
||||
CVE-2024-56700
|
||||
CVE-2024-56739
|
||||
CVE-2024-56747
|
||||
CVE-2024-56767
|
||||
CVE-2024-56769
|
||||
CVE-2024-57802
|
||||
CVE-2024-57850
|
||||
CVE-2024-57893
|
||||
CVE-2024-57901
|
||||
CVE-2024-57902
|
||||
CVE-2024-57904
|
||||
CVE-2024-57908
|
||||
CVE-2024-57912
|
||||
CVE-2024-57929
|
||||
CVE-2024-57938
|
||||
CVE-2024-57948
|
||||
CVE-2024-57973
|
||||
CVE-2024-58001
|
||||
CVE-2024-58010
|
||||
CVE-2024-58055
|
||||
CVE-2024-58094
|
||||
CVE-2024-58095
|
||||
CVE-2025-21664
|
||||
CVE-2025-21689
|
||||
CVE-2025-21699
|
||||
CVE-2025-21704
|
||||
CVE-2025-21718
|
||||
CVE-2025-21735
|
||||
CVE-2025-21736
|
||||
CVE-2025-21744
|
||||
CVE-2025-21772
|
||||
CVE-2025-21776
|
||||
CVE-2025-21781
|
||||
CVE-2025-21782
|
||||
CVE-2025-21785
|
||||
CVE-2025-21791
|
||||
CVE-2025-21835
|
||||
CVE-2025-21877
|
||||
CVE-2025-21904
|
||||
CVE-2025-21909
|
||||
CVE-2025-21910
|
||||
CVE-2025-21916
|
||||
CVE-2025-21928
|
||||
CVE-2025-21934
|
||||
CVE-2025-21935
|
||||
CVE-2025-21948
|
||||
CVE-2025-21993
|
||||
CVE-2025-21996
|
||||
CVE-2025-22007
|
||||
CVE-2025-22018
|
||||
CVE-2025-22063
|
||||
CVE-2025-22073
|
||||
CVE-2025-22079
|
||||
CVE-2025-22086
|
||||
CVE-2025-23150
|
||||
CVE-2025-23163
|
||||
CVE-2025-37738
|
||||
CVE-2025-37739
|
||||
CVE-2025-37740
|
||||
CVE-2025-37741
|
||||
CVE-2025-37749
|
||||
CVE-2025-37757
|
||||
CVE-2025-37758
|
||||
CVE-2025-37780
|
||||
CVE-2025-37781
|
||||
CVE-2025-37782
|
||||
CVE-2025-37796
|
||||
CVE-2025-37797
|
||||
CVE-2025-37798
|
||||
CVE-2025-37817
|
||||
CVE-2025-37823
|
||||
CVE-2025-37825
|
||||
CVE-2025-37833
|
||||
CVE-2025-37838
|
||||
CVE-2025-37841
|
||||
CVE-2025-37851
|
||||
CVE-2025-37857
|
||||
CVE-2025-37858
|
||||
CVE-2025-37892
|
||||
CVE-2025-37923
|
||||
CVE-2025-37925
|
||||
CVE-2025-37937
|
||||
CVE-2025-37982
|
||||
CVE-2025-37983
|
||||
CVE-2025-37990
|
||||
CVE-2025-38046
|
||||
CVE-2025-38058
|
||||
CVE-2025-38061
|
||||
CVE-2025-38066
|
||||
CVE-2025-38075
|
||||
CVE-2025-38090
|
||||
CVE-2025-38114
|
||||
CVE-2025-38115
|
||||
CVE-2025-38147
|
||||
CVE-2025-38157
|
||||
CVE-2025-38163
|
||||
CVE-2025-38174
|
||||
CVE-2025-38177
|
||||
CVE-2025-38180
|
||||
CVE-2025-38181
|
||||
CVE-2025-38184
|
||||
CVE-2025-38185
|
||||
CVE-2025-38190
|
||||
CVE-2025-38194
|
||||
CVE-2025-38203
|
||||
CVE-2025-38212
|
||||
CVE-2025-38213
|
||||
CVE-2025-38218
|
||||
CVE-2025-38219
|
||||
CVE-2025-38222
|
||||
CVE-2025-38245
|
||||
CVE-2025-38251
|
||||
CVE-2025-38265
|
||||
CVE-2025-38285
|
||||
CVE-2025-38312
|
||||
CVE-2025-38320
|
||||
CVE-2025-38324
|
||||
CVE-2025-38328
|
||||
CVE-2025-38336
|
||||
CVE-2025-38344
|
||||
CVE-2025-38345
|
||||
CVE-2025-38348
|
||||
CVE-2025-38386
|
||||
CVE-2025-38403
|
||||
CVE-2025-38406
|
||||
CVE-2025-38416
|
||||
CVE-2025-38420
|
||||
CVE-2025-38428
|
||||
CVE-2025-38445
|
||||
CVE-2025-38448
|
||||
CVE-2025-38458
|
||||
CVE-2025-38459
|
||||
CVE-2025-38460
|
||||
CVE-2025-38467
|
||||
CVE-2025-38468
|
||||
CVE-2025-38470
|
||||
CVE-2025-38474
|
||||
CVE-2025-38513
|
||||
CVE-2025-38514
|
||||
CVE-2025-38538
|
||||
CVE-2025-38542
|
||||
CVE-2025-38544
|
||||
CVE-2025-38546
|
||||
CVE-2025-38555
|
||||
CVE-2025-38574
|
||||
CVE-2025-38578
|
||||
CVE-2025-38581
|
||||
CVE-2025-38604
|
||||
CVE-2025-38611
|
||||
CVE-2025-38612
|
||||
CVE-2025-38618
|
||||
CVE-2025-38639
|
||||
CVE-2025-38691
|
||||
CVE-2025-38693
|
||||
CVE-2025-38694
|
||||
CVE-2025-38697
|
||||
CVE-2025-38698
|
||||
CVE-2025-38699
|
||||
CVE-2025-38701
|
||||
CVE-2025-38708
|
||||
CVE-2025-38712
|
||||
CVE-2025-38713
|
||||
CVE-2025-38717
|
||||
CVE-2025-39676
|
||||
CVE-2025-39691
|
||||
CVE-2025-39710
|
||||
CVE-2025-39714
|
||||
CVE-2025-39743
|
||||
CVE-2025-39751
|
||||
CVE-2025-39756
|
||||
CVE-2025-39782
|
||||
CVE-2025-39794
|
||||
CVE-2025-39796
|
||||
CVE-2025-39808
|
||||
CVE-2025-39812
|
||||
CVE-2025-39817
|
||||
CVE-2025-39839
|
||||
CVE-2025-39846
|
||||
CVE-2025-39848
|
||||
CVE-2025-39885
|
||||
CVE-2025-39889
|
||||
CVE-2025-39898
|
||||
CVE-2025-39903
|
||||
CVE-2025-39913
|
||||
CVE-2025-39920
|
||||
CVE-2025-39945
|
||||
CVE-2025-39964
|
||||
CVE-2025-39967
|
||||
CVE-2025-39973
|
||||
CVE-2025-39996
|
||||
CVE-2025-40011
|
||||
CVE-2025-40020
|
||||
CVE-2025-40022
|
||||
CVE-2025-40028
|
||||
CVE-2025-40030
|
||||
CVE-2025-40035
|
||||
CVE-2025-40044
|
||||
CVE-2025-40049
|
||||
CVE-2025-40055
|
||||
CVE-2025-40078
|
||||
CVE-2025-40082
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user