009: Magisk ship pack through US-S5-1 + US-S4 OpenSSH/Jelly/Gallery2.

Release-keys/AVB, CVE clean+hi batches, Yama/slabrand, Pro branding,
bundled apps, and AXP-class product surface docs/scripts.
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sunfish-admin committed 2026-10-05 10:42:00 +02:00
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@@ -66,8 +66,13 @@ Checked packages (package-level; process expand not fully visible in shots):
Visible unchecked (partial): Aegis, Amarok, Amaze, Aosmium.
Owner notes: most DenyList banking apps still pass; **Yuh fails** for ~weeks.
Extra Magia DenyList/host checks + Island uninstall/reclone did **not** fix Yuh.
Owner notes (2026-09-13): most DenyList banking apps still pass; **Yuh failed**
for ~weeks. Extra Magia DenyList/host checks + Island uninstall/reclone did
**not** fix Yuh at that time.
**Owner update 2026-10-02:** Yuh works again on GOLDEN after enabling Vector’s
**bootloader spoofer** module (`zygisk_vector` / Vector manager). DenyList alone
was never enough for that HA path.
## Compatibility / attestation (observational)
@@ -75,14 +80,15 @@ Extra Magia DenyList/host checks + Island uninstall/reclone did **not** fix Yuh.
|-------|--------|----------|
| Swissquote | **PASS** (owner report) | Still used; on DenyList |
| Other DenyList banks (N26, DKB, …) | **PASS** (owner: “casi todos”) | UI DenyList |
| Yuh | **FAIL** — hardware attestation / “certificate is invalid” | Owner UI + logcat ~21:51–21:52 |
| Yuh | **PASS again** (owner 2026-10-02) via Vector bootloader spoofer | Was **FAIL** 2026-09-13 (HA / “certificate is invalid”) |
| Play Integrity token path | Client path still runs | `Finsky requestIntegrityToken() finished for com.yuh`; DroidGuard `pia_attest_e1` for `com.yuh` |
| KeyMint / TEE | Errors concurrent with Yuh attempt | `keystore2`: `HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE` (IRPC / `TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT`); `addRngEntropy` → `DEAD_OBJECT` / KeyMint `-1000` |
| KeyMint / TEE | Errors concurrent with 2026-09-13 Yuh FAIL | `keystore2`: `HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE` (IRPC / `TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT`); `addRngEntropy` → `DEAD_OBJECT` / KeyMint `-1000` |
Interpretation for later `006`/`007` (not a GOLDEN fix): DenyList alone is
insufficient for Yuh’s hardware-attestation path; KeyMint/TEE remote-provisioning
errors correlate with the failure window. Project production root path remains
**KernelSU-Next (+ SusFS) or ReSukiSU evaluation** — Magisk/Magia is oracle-only.
Interpretation for Gate E / LAB: GOLDEN banking stack = Magisk DenyList +
`playintegrityfix` + `teesim` + **Vector bootloader spoofer** (owner-proven for
Yuh). Ship ROM still does **not** bake those modules (`009-magisk-preinstall-runbook`);
owner installs post-flash. Wrong PIF prints (e.g. `comet` CANARY on sunfish LAB)
break the same surface. Magisk/Magia remains the AXP oracle path for `009`.
Call recording: GOLDEN Secure dump shows native EXTENDROM
`extendrom_call_recording=1` (see `008` — port `er.sh` F_CALLREC, not Magisk