Release-keys/AVB, CVE clean+hi batches, Yama/slabrand, Pro branding, bundled apps, and AXP-class product surface docs/scripts.
5.9 KiB
Hardening backlog (non-normative)
Candidate hardening ideas for later evaluation. Not requirements until a row
is promoted into an active feature spec.md (012 / 013 or related).
Authority order for an active feature:
- Constitution
- That feature's
spec.md - This backlog /
docs/axp-pro-parity.md(hints only)
Status: candidate | investigate | accepted→spec | rejected | los-provides
Privacy / identifiers
| Idea | Notes | Status |
|---|---|---|
| SUPL IMSI/MSISDN exposure | Reduce carrier ID leakage via SUPL | candidate |
| Build.SERIAL restrictions | Identifier privacy | candidate |
| Analytics / statistics removal | Drop unused telemetry | candidate |
| Package query visibility | Tighten package visibility | candidate |
| MAC / address privacy | Wi-Fi/BT randomization policy | candidate |
| Private DNS defaults | Sensible defaults without breaking banks | candidate |
| CA-store review | Trust anchors audit | candidate |
Userspace
| Idea | Notes | Status |
|---|---|---|
| hardened_malloc | Graphene/AXP portability on sunfish | candidate |
| Bionic hardening | Selective, attributable | candidate |
| JNI protections | Safer JNI boundaries | candidate |
| Stack canaries | Confirm / strengthen where applicable | candidate |
| ptrace / Yama | Restrict debugging attach | candidate |
| seccomp | Incremental filter improvements | candidate |
| noexec / nosuid / nodev mounts | Where applicable without breaking HW | candidate |
| Dynamic code / JIT restrictions | Evaluate app compatibility cost | candidate |
| Exec spawning / ASLR-related | Attack-surface reduction | candidate |
Kernel
| Idea | Notes | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Historical GrapheneOS sunfish kernel patches/config | Device-specific commits and config known to have run on sunfish — not CONFIG-only review | candidate |
| Modern GrapheneOS kernel techniques | Evaluate equivalent/backport on sunfish 4.14; no blind cherry-picks | candidate |
| AXP/DivestOS sunfish kernel patch audit | Identify AXP-owned vs inherited vs upstream; de-duplicate against LOS | candidate |
| Applicable CVE backports | Document EOL firmware vs patchable kernel | candidate |
| CFI | Feasibility on 4.14 | candidate |
| ASLR config | Kernel/userspace related knobs | candidate |
| IPv6 privacy | Address generation / exposure | candidate |
| Debug / UART restrictions | Reduce attack surface | candidate |
| Attack-surface reduction | Drop unused drivers/configs carefully | candidate |
Kernel hardening source policy
The kernel base remains the LineageOS 23.2-compatible sunfish kernel.
Priority (009 / owner 2026-09-18): AXP clone first → LOS inventory →
IodéOS diff → optional Graphene (modern techniques / selective A13).
Do not separately mine DivestOS EOL. See docs/009-kernel-hardening-map.md.
┌─ AXP sunfish (max priority clone)
│
LOS23/A16 sunfish 4.14 ←─┼─ LOS23 already-present
OUR BASE │
├─ IodéOS (LOS fork, hardened/deblobbed)
│
└─ Graphene optional (modern / selective A13)
Not: GrapheneOS Android 13 (or any old GrapheneOS) kernel tree as our base. Not: DivestOS as a hunt target (EOL).
Candidate hardening comes from:
- AXP.OS sunfish — primary; audit actual patch stack on
rom-dev01. - LineageOS 23.2 msm-4.14 — what is already applied.
- IodéOS — diff vs LOS for extra hardening/deblob worth porting.
- GrapheneOS — optional: modern Pixel techniques adaptable to 4.14; historical sunfish A13 only if clearly still valuable.
- Original upstream — when a patch derives from Linux/AOSP common, prefer upstream form when practical.
For each candidate record:
- security problem / property;
- original source and commit;
- source lineage / provenance;
- sunfish-specific or generic;
- already present in LOS 23.2?;
- already present through another patch?;
- kernel/hardware prerequisites;
- applicability to Linux 4.14;
- port/backport required;
- compatibility/regression risk;
- test result;
- final decision.
Location: do not extra-cap vs LOS (owner GPS UX); skip AXP location lockdown in this track unless revisited later.
Much later / evaluate
| Idea | Notes | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Per-app network control | High UX/complexity | candidate |
| Sensors permission model | Graphene-like | candidate |
| Storage Scopes-like behaviour | Compatibility cost | candidate |
| Contact Scopes-like behaviour | Compatibility cost | candidate |
| Duress PIN/password | Later | candidate |
| USB restrictions | Policy toggles | candidate |
| Exploit-protection toggles | User-facing switches | candidate |
| Modernize LOS API deprecations / Kotlin annotation targets | Final-ROM hygiene (last steps), not a mid-feature gate. Measured on 005 bacon 2026-09-15 SUCCESS (~45k log lines): ~3k deprecated, ~4.5k KT-73255 annotation-target, ~8.7k “warning” hits total; 0 hard error:/FAILED: in successful run. Themes: Settings Slices [removal]; SystemUI KeyguardState/SceneContainer/CommunalScenes; DesktopMode desk APIs; FingerprintManager/Executors; SettingsLib @StringRes KT-73255. Fix API-by-API with attributable ports; never megapatch or -Xlint:-deprecation as “done”. Prefer waiting for LOS merges; only port what still warns at freeze. Own patches (005 spoofing, vendor) must stay clean first. Evidence: /srv/rom/artifacts/005-spoofing/20260915-bacon/bacon-log-triage.md. |
candidate |
EOL firmware caveat (for 013)
sunfish is EOL. The project can modify kernel/framework we build, but cannot fabricate new proprietary vendor/modem firmware. Document clearly:
- security patches we can backport in-tree;
- old proprietary firmware/baseband/vendor images we cannot fix;
- do not claim hardware protections unsupported by Pixel 4a.