AXP-Resurection/docs/009-hardening-signing-checklist.md

009 — Userspace hardening / signing / AVB checklist (Gate G)

Task: T040.
Companion: kernel half = docs/009-gate-g-kernel-attribution.md.
Policy (2026-09-29): project release keys yes; bootloader relock no (AXP/LOS unlocked norm; IOdes-class lock = non-goal). See specs/009-axp-los23-port/research.md.

Secrets never enter Git. Host material lives under /srv/rom/secrets/ on rom-dev01 only.

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Measured baseline (2026-09-29)

Prop / fact	GOLDEN (AXP Pro)	LAB (Stage1 pack)	Target
ro.build.type	user	userdebug	user for ship; userdebug OK while developing
ro.build.tags	release-keys	test-keys	release-keys
ro.build.flavor	lineage_sunfish-user	lineage_sunfish-userdebug	…-user at ship
ro.debuggable	0	0 on LAB measure wait — typically 1 on userdebug	0 on ship
ro.secure	1	(LOS default)	1
ro.boot.flash.locked	0	0	0 (unlocked — intentional)
ro.boot.verifiedbootstate	orange	orange	orange while unlocked
ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state	unlocked	(same class)	unlocked
ro.boot.veritymode	enforcing	expect enforcing	keep
SELinux	Enforcing (expect)	Enforcing	keep
OTA zip cert	AXP releasekey	AOSP testkey.x509.pem (byte-match on stage1 zip)	project releasekey
AVB signing key in tree	AXP custom	external/avb/test/data/testkey_rsa2048.pem	project AVB key
BOARD_AVB_MAKE_VBMETA_IMAGE_ARGS --flags 3	AXP sets real AVB when enabled	LOS sunfish adds --flags 3 unless WITH_AVB=true	keep flags 3 (signing infra only; not runtime harden)

LAB adb sample (device 11231JEC207477, Stage1 sideload): test-keys / userdebug / orange / flash.locked=0 / getenforce=Enforcing.

GOLDEN source: /srv/rom/references/axp/golden/2026-09-13/getprop.txt.

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What “done” means for Gate G userspace

1. Ship images/OTAs verify as release-keys (not AOSP test-keys).
2. Phonesky / microG keep their project JKS identities under /srv/rom/secrets/{phonesky,microg}-signing/ (already exist).
3. AVB build uses project keys where LOS23/sunfish allows; device stays unlocked (orange). Relock is out of scope.
4. Userspace hardening stages are attributable (patch dir + map) or explicitly deferred/skipped with reason.
5. Gaps written down — no silent omit.

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Stages (do in order)

US-S0 — Inventory (this doc) — done 2026-09-29

• Compare GOLDEN vs LAB signing/AVB props.
• Confirm stage1 zip OTA cert == AOSP testkey.
• Confirm no ~/.android-certs / platform release keys on host yet (only Phonesky + microG JKS).
• Record bootloader-lock = wont.

US-S1 — Generate project Android signing keys — done 2026-09-29 (host)

Host-only. Never commit .pk8 / private PEM.

Key	Role
releasekey	Default APK/OTA (PRODUCT_DEFAULT_DEV_CERTIFICATE)
platform	platform-signed priv-apps
shared / media / networkstack / sdk_sandbox / bluetooth / nfc	AOSP partition signing set

Procedure: scripts/009-generate-release-keys.sh on rom-dev01 → prefers /srv/rom/secrets/android-certs/ if writable, else $HOME/.android-certs (Lineage default; used 2026-09-29 because secrets/ is root-owned 750 without group write).

Mandatory before first signed ship bacon: encrypted/offline backup of that directory (constitution). Public *.x509.pem may later be copied into Git for docs; private material must not.

Acceptance:

• $HOME/.android-certs/{releasekey,platform,…}.{pk8,x509.pem} + avb.pem exist on rom-dev01 (2026-09-29T16:37Z)
• Host tar backup: /home/android-build/backups/android-certs-20260929T1637Z.tar.gz (mode 600; SHA256 in .sha256) — still copy offline/encrypted
• releasekey DN = O=AXP-Resurection, OU=sunfish-a16, CN=release (not AOSP testkey)
• Root later: install -d /srv/rom/secrets/android-certs and move keys there
• Owner offline encrypted copy confirmed

US-S2 — Wire release keys into bacon — in progress

Lineage convention: PRODUCT_DEFAULT_DEV_CERTIFICATE → path without suffix (e.g. …/releasekey). On LOS 23 / soong, env export alone is ignored — must be a product makefile PRODUCT_ (see vendor/sunfish-a16/signing.mk, inherited via magisk.mk). Verified get_build_var → project releasekey.

Keys present on rom-dev01 ($HOME/.android-certs/releasekey.pk8, 2026-09-29). First artifact 20261001T221102Z-…-cve-hi-releasekeys was still AOSP testkey (env-only wire). Rebacon after signing.mk (2026-10-01T22:12Z). CVE LAB bacons keep test-keys. First real signed bacon stays userdebug.

LAB 2026-10-02: first signed sideload booted Wi‑Fi OK but Bluetooth crash-looped — zygote selinux_android_setcontext failed with seinfo=default for com.android.bluetooth. Cause: APK signed with project certs/bluetooth.pk8 while MAINLINE_BLUETOOTH_SEPOLICY_DEV_CERTIFICATES stayed on AOSP build/make/target/product/security/ (non-com.google.android.bt default in config.mk). Fix: PRODUCT_MAINLINE_BLUETOOTH_SEPOLICY_DEV_CERTIFICATES in signing.mk (rebacon required; boot-only flash insufficient).

Acceptance:

• Zip META-INF/com/android/otacert ≠ AOSP testkey
• ro.build.tags=release-keys on LAB after sideload (boot-only flash insufficient) (note: first RK sideload still showed dev-keys on userdebug — recheck after BT fix)
• Magisk preroot + microG + Wi‑Fi and Bluetooth OK on Stage1+combo4+CVE-hi ship pack (20261002T085915Z-…-cve-hi-releasekeys, LAB 2026-10-02: BT ON, crashed 0)
• plat_mac_permissions.xml embeds project bluetooth.x509.pem (seinfo=bluetooth)
• Minor: LOS SetupWizard after Wi‑Fi connect can bounce to language step (Wi‑Fi stays connected; non-blocking; note only)
• Prior test-keys image retained for bisect (20261001T201836Z-…-cve-hi-batch2 / #49, or hi-batch3 when OK)

Script: scripts/009-bacon-axp-stage1-combo4-cve-hi-releasekeys.sh + vendor/sunfish-a16/signing.mk → vendor/sunfish-a16/certs/releasekey (in-tree copy of $HOME/.android-certs; gitignored — soong rejects paths outside ANDROID_BUILD_TOP).

US-S3 — Project AVB key (unlocked device)

Today sunfish often signs with AOSP testkey_rsa4096 (or rsa2048) and adds --flags 3 unless WITH_AVB=true (BoardConfigLineage.mk / BoardConfig-common.mk). LAB 20261002T085915Z vbmeta = AOSP testkey_rsa4096

• flags 3 (not project avb.pem).

AXP ships custom AVB keys and documents AVB2; GOLDEN stays unlocked/orange. Clone that signing posture, not IOdes lock.

Bootloader / OEM unlocking (2026-10-02): relock remains wont for this Magisk track (orange + preroot). Locking with Magisk-patched boot is a brick risk on Pixel unless the full AVB chain is enforced end-to-end — out of scope. Keep flash.locked=0 / verifiedbootstate=orange. Prefer leaving OEM unlocking enabled in Developer options as a best-effort escape hatch for future unlock attempts — it is not a guarantee of recovery, data preservation, or rescue from every failure mode (AOSP: unlock ability is conditional). Do not turn it off casually.

Wire: vendor/sunfish-a16/BoardConfig.mk overrides BOARD_AVB_* → vendor/sunfish-a16/certs/avb.pem + SHA256_RSA4096. Leave WITH_AVB unset so --flags 3 stays (Magisk-friendly).

What flags 3 means (libavb): HASHTREE_DISABLED (1) | VERIFICATION_DISABLED (2). Descriptors are not enforced at boot; this is AVB signing infrastructure, not “AVB-hardened verified boot”. Do not call US-S3 “AVB endurecido” while flags stay 3. A later stage may measure WITH_AVB=true (flags 0) + Magisk resign — separate acceptance.

Acceptance:

• BOARD_AVB_KEY_PATH → project vendor/sunfish-a16/certs/avb.pem
• Artifact gates fail closed on target_files/IMAGES (not OUT make images): pubkey sha1 == avb_pkmd.bin (≠ AOSP 2597c218…); Flags 3; verify_image --key vbmeta + --expected_chain_partition vbmeta_system; Magisk boot hash matches vbmeta; magiskboot cpio test ≠ 0
• Document clearly: runtime AVB enforce = off (flags 3) — not “AVB endurecido”
• Device still boots unlocked; Magisk preroot intact (LAB 2026-10-02 sideload + boot/vbmeta reinforce; magiskd, flash.locked=0, orange)
• No bootloader relock; OEM unlocking left enabled (escape hatch, not guarantee)

Branding (no rebacon-only)

• Wire vendor/sunfish-a16/branding.mk → TARGET_UNOFFICIAL_BUILD_ID=AXP-Resurection-Pro (full Magisk track, not slim; next bacon embeds it in ro.lineage.version)
• Ship script publishes sibling AXP-Resurection-Pro-*-sunfish.zip (hardlink/copy of Lineage bacon zip). Current artifact renamed the same way without rebuild.

US-S4 — Userspace hardening (first attributable pack)

See docs/009-us-s4-userspace-hardening.md.

• Stage 0 LAB measure (Enforcing + FBE)
• US-S4-1: strip Openssh/rsync/procmem packages from Lineage common.mk (apply_009_drop_openssh_packages.py); keep init.openssh.rc (AXP PRO)
• LAB 2026-10-02: ship 20261002T151944Z sideloaded + reinforced; see docs/009-lab-acceptance-20261002-uss4.md
• US-S4-2 (wired, pending bacon): drop Jelly + Gallery2 (AXP PRO product oracle — Fossify stays); apply_009_drop_jelly_gallery2.py + NoLineageJelly; see docs/009-axp-pro-product-apps-20260324.md

Candidate	Priority	Notes
Confirm SELinux Enforcing + encryption	done	LAB Enforcing + FBE
ptrace/Yama	done US-S5-1	LAB 162840Z CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y
Debug/bugreport surface trim	done US-S4-1	AXP PRO product oracle
Jelly + Gallery2 debloat	US-S4-2 wired	AXP PRO product; Fossify kept
mount flags / noexec where stock allows	early	don't break HW
hardened_malloc	later	Graphene/AXP; portability cost
Broad Graphene framework (scopes, etc.)	later / deferred	high UX cost; not Magisk-clone MVP

Ship patches under vendor/sunfish-a16/patches/009-axp-los23-port/hardening/ with README attribution. One stage per bacon when risk is unclear.

US-S5 — Kernel CVE mega / more Graphene (on boot-OK pack)

Do not flash old 20260918*-axp-kh-cve / kh-full (logo hang).

• CVE clean-offset 429 + hi-batch1–3 on Magisk ship (151944Z LAB OK)
• US-S5-1 LAB OK (162840Z): CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y + CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y — see docs/009-lab-acceptance-20261002-uss5.md
• Optional later: CVE-2022-49980 lock-scope port; Stage1 slab FAIL retries; hardened_malloc

Map updates: docs/009-kernel-hardening-map.md + Gate G attribution.

US-S6 — Optional later

• Switch default lunch to lineage_sunfish-user for ship
• GPG-sign published SHA sums (AXP does; nice-to-have)
• LOS23 nightly rebase (vanilla + re-apply Magisk/stage1/keys)
• Bootloader lock — wont

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Host paths

What	Path
Platform / OTA / AVB secrets	$HOME/.android-certs/ on rom-dev01 (2026-09-29); prefer /srv/rom/secrets/android-certs/ after root relocate
Certs tar backup	/home/android-build/backups/android-certs-20260929T1637Z.tar.gz
Phonesky JKS	/srv/rom/secrets/phonesky-signing/
microG JKS	/srv/rom/secrets/microg-signing/
Keygen script (repo)	scripts/009-generate-release-keys.sh
Signing README (vendor)	vendor/sunfish-a16/patches/009-axp-los23-port/signing/README.md
GOLDEN props	/srv/rom/references/axp/golden/2026-09-13/
AXP docs (mirror)	…/axpos.org/docs/knowledge/{signatures,verifiedboot}/

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Explicit non-goals

• Bootloader relock / green verified-boot for end users.
• Replacing Phonesky/microG keys with platform keys.
• Committing private keys or passphrases to Git.
• Treating missing lock as Gate G failure.